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INTRODUCTION 
During the course of the past twenty-five years since the Man-
hattan project ushered in the nuclear age, nations have expanded their 
arsenal of weapons in an effort to provide a symbolic deterrent to 
other nations that might impose on their nationalistic rights. The 
. principal component of the larger arsenals is the nuclear weapon. As 
more and more countries obtain these weapons, the threat of a possible 
nuclear confrontation could increase. Should a confrontation occur, a 
comprehensive civil defense plan to combat the effects of a nuclear 
detonation would be desirable. 
Today some Americans are apathetic whenever the topic of civil 
defense is involved. They feel·that should something drastic actually 
occur, the world would not be worth living in. However, this exterior 
of calm does not present a true picture. Although the American people 
know some protection is probably available, they are not concerned 
because the event has not actually affected them personally. The Office 
of Civil Defense, in accepting its commission from the President of the 
United States, is responsible for the development of a comprehensive 
plan of civilian defense. 
If a comprehensive plan is to be developed, some consideration 
should be given to the post-attack conditions that may result from a 
nuclear detonation. Planning should be carried out to provide some 
direction during this post-attack period. 
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If plans have been developed to provide fallout protection for a 
two-week period following the detonation of a nuclear weapon, planning 
should be initiated to provide direction beyond this period where fall­
out contamination is the principal hazard until complete disaster 
recovery is obtained. Complete recovery may require some plan to 
limit the damaging effect that may alter the production of safe water 
from a municipal water utility system. 
One method of planning for the recovery of a water utility is 
making an assess.ment of the effects that might result from a nuclear 
attack prior to the event. This assessment has been defined as a 
vulnerability analysis where the effects resulting from a nuclear 
detonation are assumed to occur, and various countermeasures are rec-
ommended to be instigated. 
The vulnerability analysis involves not only fallout protection of 
the water utility operators, but it also involves the total realm of 
the operation of a water utility. Such facets as the source of supply, 
chemicals used in the production of safe water, and the back-up system 
of electrical power available to the water utility are included (1-11). 
For this study two municipal water utilities were selected to 
provide representative examples for making a vulnerability analysis to 
determine the effects that a nuclear detonation would have on the 
operation of typical water treatment systems in South Dakota. The 
water treatment plants of eastern South Dakota draw their untreated 
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water from a groundwater aquifer, a surface water source, or possibly 
a combination of both. The water treatment plants at Brookings and 
Huron, South Dakota, were chosen for the investigation because one 
draws its untreated water solely from a groundwater aquifer and the 
other treatment plant draws its water solely from a surface water 
source. 
The general objective of this study was to determine the vulner­
ability to the effects of nuclear detonation of two selected repre­
sentative water treatment utilities in order to assess the overall 
preparedness of South Dakota Water utilities. Some specific que$tions 
of the investigation were these: 
1) Is adequate protection from radioactivity available in the 
area of the treatment plant for the operators to function 
safely during a fallout period? Could the operators continue 
to operate the plant? 
2) Will the source of water yield uncontaminated water during a 
fallout period? 
A. Can an adequate source of water be derived from a ground­
water aquifer or will an additional surface water be 
required? 
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B. Would the treatment process as available be deterimental 
or beneficial in the supply of water with acceptable 
radiation content? 
3) Is the system of distribution reliable under assumed fall­
out conditions? 
4) Is an adequate back-up power supply available to operate 
both the distribution system and the treatment plant under 
an assumed power failure following a nuclear attack? 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
History 
Prior to 1961 the pros and cons of civil defense planning had 
approximated the pattern of political events, alternately being 
stimulated and forgotten as the pattern of events dictated (2) .  In 
the spring of 1961, President John_ F. Kennedy started to revive the 
civil defense program with a call for a new 207 million dollar nuclear 
�helter program (3). The purpose of the program was to identify suf-
ficient shelter space for some 50 million Americans, or approximately 
one-fourth of the population. A portion of the initial expenditure, 
93 million dollars, was earmarked for identifying commqnity shelters 
in existing buildings. Areas which could be used as fallout shelters 
were identified in basements, subways, schools, and abandoned mines 
(3). 
It was also assumed by civil defense personnel that more than 
one-half of the American population would survive the effects of a 
nuclear attack (3).  If approximately 100 million Americans would 
survive the effects of a nuclear attack, it would seem fruitless for 
the survivors to die a few weeks later from typhoid fever or diphthe­
ria because an adequate water utility was not in satisfactory operating 
condition (2). 
The Board of Directors of the American Water Works Association 
(AWWA), recognizing the dilemma of community shelters without an 
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adequate water utility supplying them and the mass confusion being 
created by this politically hot issue, authorized the formation of a 
Committee on Radioactivity and Civil Defense. This committee cooper-
ated with the Office of Civil Defense in the United States Department 
of Defense in the development of a manual on radioactivity and civil 
defense for water utilities entitled Civil Defense Aspects of Water­
works Operations (1-1; 2). 
Members of the AWWA committee were not the only people who rec­
ognized the need for water utilities to take an active role in the 
total civil defense picture. The editors of Water Works Engineering 
proposed the topic of "Water Supply Systems in Civil Defense" for a 
roundtable discussion by mail. Mailed replies that were received from 
around the country describing the status of specific water utilities 
as p�rtaining to civil defense were presented in four successive issues. 
The general concensus of most replies was that civil defense planning 
invol�ing the water utilities was not occurring and that it was defi­
nitely needed (4, 5, 6, 7). 
Effects of Nuclear Explosions 
Before a system could be devised to adequately combat the effects 
of a nuclear attack, the investigators of the committee felt.that the 
effects of a nuclear explosion should be somewhat understood. For 
instance, when a nuclear fission weapon is detonated, the energy of the 
bomb is released as follows: 50 percent as blast and shock energy, 
35 percent as thermal radiation, 10 percent as residual nuclear 
radiation, and 5 percent as initial nuclear radiation (8-8). 
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Although the energy distribution is heavily weighted towards the 
blast and thermal energy, the damage caused by these two types of 
energy is not extensive beyond the immediate area surrounding the 
point of detonation. The immediate area where the blast and thermal 
effects are prevalent is within a radius of 60 miles from the point of 
detonation, or ground zero, for a 20-megaton explosion (1-6). Even 
though residual radiation comprises only ten percent of the total 
energy released, the possible damage caused by it is more widespread. 
The residual radiation affects an area roughly 100 or more times. great-
er than the area damaged by the effects of blast and thermal radiation 
(9) . 
The principal effect of the blast energy is the creation of a con-
dition known as overpressure (2) which is defined as: 
o • •  the transient pressure usually expressed in 
pounds per square inch, exceeding the ambient pres­
sure manifested in the shock (or blast) wave from an 
explosion (8-709). 
A few seconds after the nuclear device is detonated the blast wave 
moves away from ground zero as an overpressure shock front at a 
speed slightly greater than the speed of sound. After a momentary 
elapse time, a negative pressure front follows the high pressure 
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front. The combined effect of these two pressure fronts is to squeeze 
and then expand the structures in their paths. If the structures ex­
pand too rapidly, they explode during the expansion (1-3, 4). 
Safety of personnel in the path of the pressure fronts depends on 
the magnitude of the blast pressure that reaches them and th� resis-
tance of their protecting structure or shelter to the overpressure 
· condition. Utility personnel caught in the open when the blast front 
pass�s are subject to damage from flying debris. The flying missiles 
consist of brick, pieces of masonry, glass, pieces of wood, metal, 
etc. They also could experience damage to their eardrums and lungs as 
a result of the overpressure condition. This type of internal damage 
is limited to a ten-mile radius from ground zero (1-3). The extent of 
the damage caused by the overpressure front is dependent upon the size 
of the detonation. Furthermore, the magnitude of the damage decreases 
as the distance from the point of detonation increases (10). 
When a nuclear weapon is detonated, approximately 35 percent of 
the total energy dissipated is in the form of thermal radiation. For 
a one-megaton ·explosion, personnel standing in the open would experi­
ence second-degree burns on exposed skin up to a distance of nine 
miles from ground zero (10). Because thermal radiation travels in 
straight lines from the fireball source, any opaque material between 
a given object and the fireball acts as a shield and provides some 
degree of protection (1-2, 6). Like the blast effects, the severity 
of the damage caused by the thermal energy is inversely proportional 
to the distance from ground zero, but not in a linear relationship 
(1-2). 
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The remaining 15 percent of the total energy from the detonation 
is released in the form of nuclear radiation. The radioactivity is 
divided into initial and residual radiation. The former consists of 
approximately five percent of the total energy of the bomb (8-8). The 
radiation emitted during the first minute after a nuclear device 
detonates is defined as initial nuclear radiation. This type of radi-
ation consists of gamma rays, neutrons, alpha particles, and beta 
particles. Of the four types of particles mentioned, the neutrons and 
gamma rays are the significant health hazards. At close range these 
two forms of radiation have an appreciable penetrating power and are 
extremely difficult to protect against. But, as the distance increases 
from the point of detonation, the intensity of radioactive fallout 
decreases (10). 
The long-term damaging effects of a nuclear explosion are asso­
ciated with the radioactivity present in the residual fallout (1-5). 
Residual nuclear radiation is defined as that radiation emitted after 
one minute has elapsed from the actual nuclear detonation. It is 
comprised of the radiation stemming from the fission fragments and 
bomb debris, a complex mixture of some 200 isotopes of 35 elements. 
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The majority of the unstable isotopes produced are radioactive and 
decay at varying rates (10). 
The residual fallout and its accompanying radiation is the signif-
icant threat to life compared to the other types of energy released 
(10). It has the most significant effect because it is distributed 
over an area much larger than the areas where blast, heat, and ini­
tial radiation are significant. Therefore, it is possible for people 
to become casualties at locations far beyond the area where the blast 
and thermal damage are significant (1-5). 
The accurate prediction of an early fallout pattern of the residual 
radioactivity is a highly complex topic with many variables to consider. 
But, in general, the pattern expands downwind from the point of deto­
nation, following an elongated pear-shaped growth with the downwind 
portion expanding laterally. Therefore, the upwind residents will ex­
perience relatively small amounts of the early fallout radiation (2). 
Figure -1 is a diagram of an idealized early fallout pattern for a nu­
clear detonation showing the elongated pear-shaped characteristics 
(1-7). 
The rate of radioactive decay of the 200 unstable isotopes created 
at the time of detonation starts instantly (10). Within any group of 
fallout particles, there is a wide variety of isotopes, each having a 
different decay rate. Initially for a mixture of fission products, 
the radiation level starts high but drops quickly as the short 
11 
-----
Wind Direction 
Ground zero 
Figure 1. Idealized early fallout pattern 
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half-life isotopes decay (1-7) .  The rate of decay of radioactivity 
in the combined fission fragments is expressed mathematically thus: 
in which R
t 
is the intensity of radiation at time (t) ; R1 is the inten­
sity of radiation one hour after detonation; and t is the time in hours 
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A simplified approximation for the above equation is that for 
every sevenfold increase in time after the detonation, the activity 
of the fallout decreases by a factor of ten. An example of this rule 
is that if after one hour from the time of detonation the radiation 
intensity is 1, 000 roentgens/hr, seven hours later the intensity will 
be 100 roentgens/hr, and forty-nine hours later the intensity will be 
10 roentgens/hr, etc. (10). 
The effects on personnel to radiation hazards stem from the fall-
out particles themselves. The air through which they pass or the sur-
faces on which they settle are not radioactive. If the fallout particles 
are removed, the danger from radiation sickness is absent (1-7). 
The contamination resulting from fallout is related to the radio-
active dose, roentgens (1-11). The following is the definition of a 
roentgen: 
•. .  the quantity of X or gamma rays that will produce 
in air ions carrying an electrostatic unit of elec­
tricity of either sign per unit cubic centimet�r at 
standard temperature and pressure (11-528). 
According to the committee reports, the major hazard to life is 
the gamma radiation. This type of radiation is effective a great 
distance from the particle, and it has considerable penetrating power. 
Published articles using the example of a detector located three feet 
above the ground, report approximately 50 percent of the dose rate 
received in the center of a large, flat, uniformly contaminated area 
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came from a distance greater than 50 feet, and about 25 percent came 
from distances more than 200 feet away (1-7). 
The intensity of the radiation dose varies from an almost insig-
nificant dose at a location far removed from the point of detonation 
to rates in excess of 1, 000 roentgens for individual exposures. The 
effects of the varying doses on the individual are summarized in the 
following table. 
Table 1. Effects of Radioactive Exposure on Workers (9) 
Short term 
dose 
(roentgens) 
50 
75-100 
200 
450 
600 
256701 
Effects 
No visible effects, able to work. 
On the day of exposure, brief periods of 
nausea for ten percent of those exposed, 
able to work. 
As many as 50 percent may experience some 
symptoms of radiation sickness. Only 
five to ten percent will require medical 
attention. No deaths expected, able to 
work. 
Serious radiation sickness for most 
followed by death to 50 percent within 
a two to four week period. Workers are 
unable to work. 
Serious radiation sickness for all 
followed by death to most within a 
one to three week period. Unable to 
work. 
SOUTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. 
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Vulnerability Analysis 
When the Board of Directors of the AWWA commissioned the Commit-
tee on Radioactivity and Civil Defense to prepare a guide manual for 
the water utilities, the initial table of contents contained various 
topics including disaster planning, emergency sources and supply pro-
cedures, post-attack assessment of plant operation, protective measures, 
and vulnerability analysis of the water utility (2). The last topic 
listed, vulnerability analysis, was a new concept recognized by the 
committee. It expanded the idea of protection beyond the scope of only 
radioactive protection to include the total area involved in the 
operation of a water utility. 
Whitley (10), a member of the AWWA committee, published an article 
during an interim study in which he strongly advocated this concept of 
preattack assessment of the situation in which the utility was operating. 
Whitley felt that in order to fulfill the objectives of providing water 
for ess�ntial use following a nuclear attack, the officials of the water 
utilities had to be cognizant of the effects that such warfare had on 
the operation of a water utility and the key personnel operating the 
plant. He also felt that advance planning and preparation would make 
possible the implementation of countermeasures designed to minimize the 
damage and facilitate recovery (10). 
When the idea of a vulnerability analysis was proposed, various 
concepts were presented as to what an investigation of this type should 
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encompass. The committee recommended that more than just fallout 
protection should be studied. Their definition (1-11) of the problem 
was this: 
The vulnerability of a water system to a nuclear 
attack is the degree to which the service of an 
adequate supply of water would be adversely affected 
by the effects of an attack. 
The committee also mentioned other areas for consideration, such as 
raw materials, equipment required for operation, and personnel pro-
tection, availability, and training (1-11). 
To investigate the areas listed for consideration, the researchers 
of the committee made a more extensive list in which they set forth 
specific topics to be investigated. By investigating the topics listed, 
they felt that this action would provide a better guide by which they 
could. assess the vulnerability of the treatment plants to the damaging 
effects of a nuclear detonation. Below is the more extensive list of 
the topics investigated (1-11): 
1) Source of water 
2) Treatment facilities and processes 
3) Transmission facilities 
4) Storage facilities 
5) Distribution facilities 
6) Structures 
7) Power 
8) Communication 
9) Equipment 
10) Material and supplies 
11) · Emergency procedures 
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As a result of the investigations made by the research commit­
tee, some of the items in the more extensive list could be deleted 
from the vulnerability assessment if the distance separating the plant 
from the point of detonation was above a prescribed distance. The 
committee noted that unless the water utility structures are located 
within a 60-mile radius of the point of detonation, the vulnerability 
to blast and to thermal damage of items two through five (treatment, 
transmission, storage, and distribution facilities) is extremely low. 
Beyond this distance from ground zero, the major hazard would be fall­
out radiation to human life (1-6; 9). 
Source. Certainly the source from which the utili�y draws its 
water affects its vulnerability. If the source is a groundwater 
aquifer, the treatment process could generally be bypassed with only 
chlorine added for disinfection purposes (9). Harmon and Ludwig (9) 
proposed this concept of pumping directly into the mains thereby 
eliminating the need for operators to subject themselves to the fall­
out radiation. 
For a water utility using a source that is vulnerable to fall­
out contamination, such as a river,·problems were expected during the 
early period of fallout (2). Several technical papers on the subject 
of removing radioactivity from surfa�e waters have been published. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of various purification methods con­
tained in the literature on this subject. Even when the removal 
Table 2. Removal of Fallout Radioactivity in Water 
Process Removal or Decay 
Coagulation, sedimentation, 
filtration* 
Distillation* 
Ion exchange* 
Boiling and chlorination 
Dilution or storage 
50-90 percent 
99 percent 
99+ percent 
none 
variable, depending on the 
specific nuclides in the solu­
tion 
* 
These processes will concentrate radioactivity in 
sludge or ion-exchange resins, and they may require 
special precautions by operating personnel. 
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efficiency is extremely high, Whitley felt that the initial amount of 
activity would be too high to be adequately removed by conventional 
water treatment practice (10) . 
Structures. As was mentioned previously, the most dangerous 
effect of a nuclear attack is the external radiation originating from 
the fallout particles. Furthermore, if the radiation dose received 
by an individual is above 200 roentgens, the individual cannot be ex­
pected to continue to work. To minimize the potential damange, the 
AWWA committee proposed shelter areas within the treatment plant 
structure. By having these designated areas, the operators would have 
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a haven to which they could return so that the radiation dose received 
might be kept below the prescribed maximum dose of 200 roentgens (10). 
The Office of Civil Defense in its national shelter program has 
prescribed that the reduction in radiation dose received by a person 
in a shelter compared to the dose received by a person standing in an 
adjacent open area should be 0. 025 for the shelter to protect adequately 
its occupants provided they did not intermittantly expose themselves to 
the fallout radiation (12). Because the operational personnel of the 
water utility would have to expose themselves periodically to danger­
ous levels of radiation, it was thought desirable to obtain the best 
possible protection for the emergency operating personnel. The recom­
mendation of the AWWA committee was a minimum protection factor of at 
least 100 (1-33). The protection factor is defined as the reciprocal 
of the radiation reduction factor. A radiation reduction factor of 
0. 01 was equivalent to only one percent of the fallout radiation 
reaching the individual in the shelter as compared to a person standing 
unprotected in an adjacent open field. Thus, a radiation reduction 
factor of 0. 01 provides a protection factor of 100 and a radiation 
reduction factor of 0.02 5 provides a protection factor of 40. 
With a protection factor of 100 being advocated by the research 
committee, the concept of a core protection area was also proposed. 
This concept consisted of a core shelter area which was relatively 
small, but which had a high protection factor, surrounded by a larger 
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area that had a lower protection factor. By using this concept, the 
committee felt that during the critical period, when the outside dose 
was lethal, the operators could stay within this limited area which 
had a minimum of space and ventilation. After the critical period 
had passed, the operating personnel could then use the larger shelter 
areas where better living conditions were available (1-33). 
When the time comes to evaluate areas for fallout protection, 
adequate space should be provided so that the operating personnel can 
have his family with him during the emergency period. Contrary to 
what many authorities have advocated, a man should not have to choose 
between the obligation he has to his family and his duty to the com­
munity. Even though numerous problems may be encountered involving 
keeping a family together, the foresight to provide adequate space may 
insure that the operating personnel will accept their responsibilities 
in the water utility post-attack operation (1-61; 2). 
Power. In the determination of the vulnerability of a water 
treatment plant, the source or system of power used would be a factor 
(2). If the generating source for the electrical power was located 
within the zone of destruction affected by the shock and thermal 
energy, some electrical power could be expected to be lost. Most 
water treatment plants, to comply with state requirements, are advised 
to have a dual system of power to the raw and finished pumps (13-335). 
But, if an adequate supply of power was not available to operate the 
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equipment within the plant, a bottleneck would be created which would 
deprive the needed water from the inhabitants of the community. 
Furthermore, if sufficient electrical power was not available, it was 
recommended that the treatment be by-passed in order to supply the re­
quired water (1-54). 
For a vulnerability assessment of the power supply for a water 
treatment plant, various factors such as fuel supply, structures, 
transmission lines, distribution centers and cross ties with other 
systems were recommended for investigation. A water utility with safe 
water to deliver, but with no electric power for its pumps was classi-
fied as helpless, therefore this facet must be investigated (2). 
Communication. Another factor that would not have a direct bearing 
on the vulnerability of a water utility, but would affect the community 
served by the utility was the mode of informing the general public as 
to the quality and quantity of water available to them. Statements 
issued by the water utility should be concise and presented in order 
to eliminate as much anxiety as possible. As a part of the vulnerabili­
ty assessment, an advance survey should be made of all possible means 
of communication, and plans should be prepared for their coordination. 
With accurate information supplied to the public, much of the anxiety 
would be eliminated because a major portion of the post-attack sur­
vivors would h�ve either covered distribution reservoirs or groundwater 
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water sources available, and this water, if properly handled, would be 
free of radioactive contamination (1-55). 
Equipment. Because it is essential that the operators know the 
radiation intensity in their working environment, radiation survey and 
monitoring equipment is necessary. There are three potential needs: 
(a) a survey meter to measure high_levels of radiation in the range of 
zero to 600 roentgens per hour, (b) a survey instrument to measure 
low levels of radiation in the range of zero to 20 milliroentgens per 
hour which could be used in the emergency measurements of radioactivity 
in food and water, and (c) radiation dosimeters with a range of zero to 
200 roentgens to measure and record the total radiation.to which oper­
ating personnel are exposed during attack and post-attack periods (10). 
If the personnel are expected to work under these conditions, an 
adequate number of personnel should be trained in the use of the appro­
priate survey equipment. Whitley also recommended that the operators be 
taught the effects of radiation and decay phenomena so that if they had 
to work during a radioactive fallout period, they could calculate their 
own exposure dose. Furthermore, the foreman of the water utility 
could stagger the work load between the operators in order to keep the 
total accumulated individual dose as low as possible (10). 
Material and Supplies. Another facet of the water utility 
suggested for investigation was the topic of material and supplies. 
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The AWWA committee recommended that a minimum 30-day chemical supply 
should be maintained at the treatment plant (1-54;9). Other emergency 
mobile water treatment facilities recommended to be maintained were 
both chlorination and filtration units with coagulation facilities 
(1-54). In the National Water Emergency Plan, written by the Office 
of Emergency Planning, the authors stated that it was the responsibility 
of local water utility personnel to maintain or to have accessible 
reserve stocks of essential chemicals and other operating supplies, 
standby equipment ,- and spare parts in adequate numbers for at least 
ten days' requirements (14). 
Planning to Reduce Vulnerab ility 
The concept necessitating a preattack assessment of the vulner-
ability of 
definition 
I 
·1·t thT water uti 1 y 
of
,
reliability: 
is related to Babbit, Doland and Cleasby's 
Reliability of a waterworks is provided through 
the development of an inexhaustible source of supply 
or by supplementing an uncertain source with adequate 
storage, by the constructi.on of adequate pumping where 
gravity cannot be used for conveyance and distribu­
tion; by the construction of substantial structures 
and equipment, by foresight in minimizing dangers 
from fire, flood, earthquake, sabotage, and other 
emergencies, and by the duplication of such struc­
tures, equipment, the breakdown of which might be 
disastrous to the supply of water (15-581). 
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Certainly, using the foresight to eliminate the damage of a nuclear 
attack by using a preattack vulnerability analysis would correspond to 
their reliability concept. 
A few cities have used a vulnerability analysis to aid in their 
overall civil defense planning. The city of l.ansing, Michigan, has 
coordinated its water utility expansion to follow its civil defense 
plan. The city has located and constructed additional units in the 
system in areas of less vulnerability as determined by the city engineer 
to insure post-attack operation (2). 
The city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has constructed by-pass 
facilities, so that untreated but chlorinated raw water could be 
pumped directly into the distribution system. To insure that the· 
pumps will be in operating condition, the city has also constructed 
blast resistant pumping stations (16). 
These two examples show how two communities have sought to help 
themselves to survive the effects of a nuclear attack. This concept of 
self-help was defined by the Department of Defense in its initial 
publication as to be the fundamental principle of civil defense (17). 
The concept was also advocated as being essential by the AWWA committee 
if this country was to survive a nuclear attack. 
The authors of the design text, Water Treatment Plant Design, 
have also recognized the problem of adequate fallout protection. They 
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have recommended that in future designs some provision be made for a 
fallout shelter for the operating staff in the event of a nuclear 
attack ( 13-335). 
CRITERIA AND METHOD OF DETERMINING 
WATERWORKS VULNERABILITY 
When a nuclear weapon is detonated, the effects of the weapon 
can be predicted to some degree. As stated previously the three 
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effects are blast, thermal, and fallout radiation. During the course 
of this investigation, it was assumed that a nuclear weapon would not 
be detonated within a sixty-mile radius of the two water treatment 
plants that were selected for study. By making this assumption, the 
researcher eliminated from consideration the blast and thermal effects 
and used in the investigation only the fallout effect and the related 
facets. 
Because the investigation was concerned with the status of water 
treatment utilities as pertaining to civil defense in eastern South 
Dakota, two water treatment plants, Huron and Brookings, were chosen 
for the investigation. Brookings draws its water from a groundwater 
. 
1 
aquifer located one mile north of the community along US Highway 77 
and the water treatment utility at Huron draws its water solely from the 
h t ·t 2 James River that flows through t a communi y. 
1
obtained in a personal interview with Dwayne Kruse, Municipal 
Utility Building, Brookings, South Dakota. 
2
obtained in a personal interview with Glenn Housiaux, city 
engineer, and Harold Root, chief waterworks operator at Huron, South 
Dakota. 
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A fallout shelter survey was conducted at the Brookings and Huron 
water treatment plants to determine if adequate fallout protection was 
available. According to an Office of Civil Defense Publication, pro­
tection of the operators from fallout should be provided within the 
treatment plants. It also recommends a protection factor of 100 be the 
minimum standard because of the periodic exposures to which waterworks 
operators would be subjected. Information was obtained by extracting 
the building dimensions and physical characteristics from the plans 
furnished by each respective water utility system. An on-site in­
spection was also made to determine the physical layout of the area 
surrounding the water treatment plants. Information obtained from the 
survey was used as input data (See Appendix) for a computer program 
developed by the Direct Mail Shelter Survey Development System within 
the Office of Civil Defense for the identification of community 
shelters (21-6) . The results from this computer operation were used 
to determine whether adequate fallout protection was available at the 
sites of the water treatment plants. 
Another facet of the water utility operation that was investigated 
was the amount of chemical supplies that would be available in the 
event of a nuclear attack. As previously mentioned, the AWWA committee 
recommended a 30-day minimum supply of chemicals used in the water 
treatment operation. Information concerning the status of the water 
treatment plants was obtained by personal interview with knowledgeable 
personnel such as the chief water works operator or the city en­
gineer. 
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An interview was also used as the method of obtaining information 
concerning back-up power generation equipment, source and location of 
primary and alternative supplies of raw water, quantity of the raw 
water, and amount of elevated storage available for the treated water, 
all of which were considered in the vulnerability analysis. 
In order that a water utility may be reliable, adequate electrical 
power has to be available at all times. The recommendation of the 
AWWA committee was that a dual source of power should be maintained 
(1 -59). In additton, the AWWA committee also endorsed the concept 
that portable water pumps with fuel operated units be made available 
for emergency use by the water utility system. 
Information concerning the source of raw water supply was used to 
determine whether the treatment process could possibly be by-passed, 
thereby eliminating the need for water utility personnel to subject 
themselves to possible dangerous levels of radiation. Several authors 
have stated that if adequate pumping capacity was available, the treat­
ment processes could be by-passed provided the source of raw water 
came from a non-radioactive, groundwater aquifer. If the source of 
raw water was a surface impoundment or river, the treatment processes 
would be required to remove the radioactive particles in order that 
the raw water be improved to potable quality. 
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The following questions were used as a basis of determining the 
vulnerability of the two selected water utilities: 
A .  Three questions pertaining to the raw water source 
were asked: 
1 .  What was the gallonage pumped in 1969? 
2 .  What is the location of your raw water source? 
3 .  What is the qualLty of the raw water? 
B .  Would there be a 30-day minimum supply of chemicals 
available at the v.ater treatment plant in the event 
of a nuclear attack? 
C .  Is there a satisfactory system of back-up power 
available to the water utility if the main source 
of electrical power is lost? Can the treated water 
be pumped from the clear wells to the distribution 
mains if the main source of electrical power is 
lost? 
D. How much elevated storage is available for the 
treated water? 
E. Has there been any contact from the civil defense 
personnel on the status of your water treatment 
utility as pertaining to continued operation during 
a nuclear disaster? 
The answers to these questions and the results of the fallout 
shelter survey analysis were used as a basis of determining whether or 
not the water utility would be vulnerable to the effects of a nuclear 
attack. 
The answers to these questions also provided a foundation by 
which recommendations could be made concerning the water utility systems 
and by which the various measures could be taken to counteract the 
damaging effects of a nuclear disaster. 
2 9  
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PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Fallout Protection 
The Direct Shelter Survey Development System has developed a 
computer program which takes the data furnished by various analysts 
from various areas in the country and analyzes the information for 
fallout protection . The calculation of protection factors rests on 
the gross characteristics of the buildings, i. e . ,  the physical dimen­
sions of the building, interior partitions, aperture openings, etc. 
The computer takes the information fed into it and computes the pro­
tection factors present within the building. 
After the results of the computer analysis were returned for this 
study, another on-site inspection was made of each treatment plant. 
Areas identified by the computer were inspected to determine if shelter 
space actually existed. The area was also inspected to observe if any 
object or obstruction was occupying the area as defined by the computer. 
The information received from the computer operation was more extensive 
than the information obtained from manually calculating the protection 
factors. The computer program that was used also delineated multiple 
protection areas within the treatment plant. 
Information pertaining to the two water treatment utilities that 
were investigated showed that some fallout protection was available. 
However, in the case of Brookings the areas identified by the computer 
as possible protection areas did not have a protection factor above 
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the minimum value, 100, recommended by the AWWA committee. Further­
m�re, some of the areas that were identified were not acceptable 
because of the usage made of the area by the treatment process. For 
instance, an area that was identified in the center of the Brookings 
treatment plant as an area of shelter that had a protection factor 
equaling 74 ; however, this location would not be normally used. The 
coagulation basins are located in the area identified and consequently 
the area would be unavailable. Another area identified as an area of 
protection was the lavatory facilities of the Brookings treatment 
plant. This area, if the need arose, could be used as an area of fall­
out protection. The protection afforded by this area was only 48. A 
protection factor of this level would provide protection to the oper­
ators amounting to 1/48 or 0.0208 of the radiation dose that would be 
received by a person standing in an outside adjacent area unprotected 
by any physical barrier or construction. However, a protection factor 
of 48 is below the minimum recommended by the AWWA committee. 
The protection factors were not larger at the two areas previously 
mentioned because of the physical characteristics of the building. The 
mass of walls per square foot was not larger because the area occupied 
by the windows and doors had essentially a zero mass thickness. To 
account for these areas, the researcher smeared the walls in order to 
obtain an average wall mass (12-631). If the initial mass of the walls 
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had been larger, or the percentage of the aperture openings had been 
smaller, the protection available would have increas-ed proportionately. 
At the Huron water treatment plant ,. fal lout protec.tiun· was �lso 
available. �n Huron, the water treatme-nt plant i:s: Io_catm
t� on a side .­
hill which p�ovides some fallout protection by it� orientation to the 
surrounding area. Figure 2 is a diagram of the- cfimens-±ans:- used for 
the calculation of fallout protection at the- Huron water. treatment 
plant. B 
Figure : 2. 
C 
Part 1 
142 ' 
A 
l 
--+ 1 Part 2 
� 40'" 
I 
I 
5 9 '  
n 
Physical layout of Huron water treatment plant 
In order to use the . SAND analy'sis forms for the fallout shelter 
survey, · as was done at Brookings, the building at Huron ra d  to be 
divided into portions because the building dimensions were not uniform. 
The building was divided as shown in Figure 2. Part 1 of the Huron 
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water treatment plant had two stories . In Part I the first story had 
·the overal l  dimensions of 142 feet by 115 feet . The s-econd . sxory of 
this part was set back 56 feet from side-s: A, B,. and. ll as:- shown by the . 
shaded area ip. Figure 2. The protectio·n factors- i.dent±f:la.d:_ iil Part L 
were ten and �even for the first and second story: center· detector 
locations, respectively . The low protection factor� s-tem from the 
aperture percentage averaging 20 for the four s-ides of. the- building, 
2. ' 
and the low initial mass of the walls, 90 1bs/ft , f:o:r the: waTls in 
this part of the building. 
In Part 2 of the Huron water treatment plant, the protection 
factor in the center location of the basement was 13ff. This value 
exceeded the recommendation of the AWWA committee, which endorsed · a 
protection factor of 100 for a portion of the water utility structure. 
The high prot�ction factor stemmed from the orientation of this por-
tion of the building to the surrounding area. In addition, the base-
ment and firs:t story of Part 2 were below grade line when compared to 
Part 1 of thl total building. By being below the grade line, the 
- 1  
basement area was protected by a twelve-foot earth embankment on the 
west and south sides. In addition, the thickness of the overhead mass 
comprising the floors above the basement location was large. The 
radiation that would reach this area would also be attenuate� by a 
geometric factor of 39 feet . · The thickness of the overhead floors had 
2 
an initial mass of 100 lbs/ft . The floor of the first story of Part 
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2 had a mass weight of 20 lbs/ft . The low mass weight of the floor 
stemmed from an extremely large opening in the center of the floor . If 
this opening had been absent, the protection factor would have been 
greater . 
The area in the Huron water treatment plant that was identified 
as a high protection area was a large open area which had been used for 
a storage area. At the time of the second shelter survey, the area was 
completely clear of all obstructions. Therefore, sufficient space 
would be available for the operators to have their families with them 
during the post-attack operating period. According to the results 
of the computer operation, sufficient space was available for 236 per-
sons within this area ; however, forced ventilation might be required . 
This large area and the high degree of protection given by this area 
would help to insure that the operators, as well as their families, 
cou1d safely assume their positions in the post-attack operation of a 
water utility once a plan was devised. 
Chemical Supply 
At both the Brookings and Huron water treatment plants, the supply 
of chemicals required in the water treatment operation exceeded the 
recommended 30-day minimum supply endorsed by the AWWA committee. At 
Huron, which employs a lime-soda ash softening process, the supply of 
chemicals available to operate the treatment system included activated 
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carbon, one year ; lime, 45 days ; soda ash, 60 to 90 days ; chlorine, 45 
1 
to 60 days ; and coagulant aids, 40 days. During the course of the 
personal interview, the chief waterworks operator stated that these 
were minimum values and that he expected to be restocked with chemicals 
within a short period of time. 
The picture at Brookings as pertaining to the supply of chemicals 
was similar to that of Huron. The treatment process at Brookings, 
which is essentially a lime addition for the removal of iron, had 
available the following supply chemicals for use: lime, 60 days ; 
2 
alum and fluoride, 35 days ; and chlorine, 60 to 90 days. 
As is evident by the list of chemicals available at both water 
treatment plants, the criterion of a minimum 30-day supply would have 
been more than satisfied when the vulnerability was assessed. 
Power System 
When the question was asked concerning what system of back�up 
power was available for the utilities in the event that the main 
source of electrical power was lost, the replies from the water utility 
spokesman of Brookings were more encouraging than those from the Huron 
counterpart. Brookings does have a back-up system of power generation 
1 
Obtained in a personal interview with Glenn Housiaux, city en-
gineer and Harold Root, chief waterworks operator at Huron, South 
Dakota. 
2
obtained in a personal interview with Dwayne Kruse, Municipal 
Utility Building, Brookings , South Dakota . . 
36 
for both its treatment system and its distribution system. It has two 
gasoline engine-driven pumps to pump from the clear well to the 
elevated storage tanks, which have a capacity of 900, 000 gallons. 
Fa.ch pump is driven by a high-lift gasoline motor, one pump having a 
capacity of 1000 gal/min and the other, a capacity of 500 gal/min. 
Brookings also has a back-up system to pump raw water from the aquifer 
to the treatment plant. At one well, the city has installed a gaso­
line engine to drive a pump with a capacity of 650 gal/min ; further­
more, . Brookings has the ability on short notice to install two portable 
generators at other well sites to furnish sufficient power to drive 
pumps with capaci_ties of 1, 500 and 1, 000 gal/min. With Brookings 
having an adequate back-up system of power, the utility is in a favor­
able position in this regard when the effects stemming from a nuclear 
detonation are considered. 
rhe municipal water utility at Huron was not in the same favorable 
situation as was Brookings. Should its main system of electrical power 
fail, the water treatment plant would be essentially useless . Huron 
has no separate back-up system of power to operate its treatment 
facility. Because Huron draws its water solely from the James River, 
and because treatment would be required to reduce the radioactive con­
tent of the water to acceptable levels, a power failure would represent 
a severe hazard. 
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Even if the criteria of determining the vulnerability of the 
water utility were not based solely on the effects of nuclear contami-
nation, the s.i tuation at Huron would be class±fied aS: critical. What 
would be the _effect on the Huron water treatment s-ys--tem ih the event 
of an ice sto,rm of sufficient magnitude to break electrical distribution 
lines? As in the case of a nuclear disaster, the wa�er treatment 
facility would be helpless. This condition of no electrical power 
·, 
would certainly be classified as a critical factor· when the vulner-
ability of the water utility system was considered . 
The water treatment plant at Huron has a back-up system of power 
by which it could pump from its three million gallon clear well to the 
elevated storage portion of its distribution system. The city has one 
high-speed Fairbanks diesel pump with a rated capacity of 2, 000 gal/min 
to pump treated water from its clear wells to the distribution system. 
The capacity of the elevated storage within the distribution system is 
1 . 5  million gallons. With the daily consumption in the calendar year, 
1969, averag�ng 2, 155, 704 gallons, it is evident that Huron does not 
have an adequate supply of water should its treatment facility cease to 
function properly. Granted that the daily water consumption would be 
lower than the value stated under fallout conditions, the point still 
remains that the supply of potable water would probably not be suffi-
cient. 
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After all facets have been considered pertaining to a system of 
power for the two treatment plants, the Brookings water treatment 
facility would not be considered to be adversely affected for an ex­
tended period should the main source of electrical power be lost, 
whereas the water utility at Huron would certainly be classified as 
vulnerable to the effects of a power outage. 
Treatment By-pass 
It was determined by personal interview that the water treatment 
plants at Huron and Brookings could both be by-passed if the need 
arose. However, the circumstances surrounding the source of raw water 
would not deem this alternative to be desirable in both· cases. 
;Brookings draws its water from a groundwater aquifer of potable 
quality. Concentrations of certain chemical characteristics, partic­
ularly iron and manganese, exceed the limits in the drinking water 
standards recommended by the United States Public Health Service, but 
the water would still be considered as potable (18, 19). 
Huron presently draws its water solely from the James River which 
flows through that community. At one time, Huron also had a well 
field located west of that community. At the present time, however, 
the collection sy.stem used to convey the raw water from the well field 
to the distribution system is reported to be in deplorable condition. 
According to a personal interview with Huron ' s  city engineer, this 
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source of raw water would not be available on short notice without 
extensive repairs to the collection system. 
Furthermore, even though the Huron community were without a 
supply of water, it would not be advisable to by-pass the treatment 
plant with the surface water source. The James River above Huron and 
its tributaries are known to receive wastewaters from numerous cities 
and industries (20). As a result, the James River would likely be 
polluted with harmful bacteriological organisms. Therefore, because 
of the organic pollution emptied into the river system, it would not be 
advisable for the Huron waterworks operators to by-pass the treatment 
plant and pump raw water directly into the distribution system. 
Civil Defense Planning 
Another question asked of both water utility spokesmen pertained 
to civil defense planning involving each water utility system. Neither 
of them stated that he had any previous contact from civil defense per ­
sonnel. Furthermore, their knowledge of the various types of radiation 
detection equipment that would be required if they had to operate the 
water treatment plant during a fallout period was nil. 
If, in the future, the ci vil defense personnel do for
mulate a plan 
of a post-attack operation of the water utilities, 
an on-site education-
al ld h to be 1· n1· tiated to inform th
e water utility per-process wou ave 
sonnel of the various facets involved in fallo
ut protection. 
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SUMMARY 
The following table is a summary of the results of the various 
questions used in the vulnerability analysis of the two water treatment 
plants investigated. 
The answers to these questions provide a foundation by which the 
conclusions could be drawn from this study. 
Table 2 .  Summary of  the Vulnerability Investigation 
Question 
What was dai ly gallonage pumped in 1969? 
What is the raw water source? 
Is the raw water potable? 
How large is  your clearwell? 
How large is  your elevated storage? 
Is there avai lable a 30-day supply of all 
chemicals used in the water uti lity department? 
ls there a back-up system of power for : 
a .  the treatment plant? 
b .  the distribution system? 
Would i t  be pos sible to by-pas s the treatment 
plant? 
What degree of fallout protection is  available? 
Has there been any contact from civil defense 
personnel pertaining to post-attack 
operations? 
Brookings 
1 , 1 74 , 432 
Groundwater--7 
wells located north 
of Brookings 
yes 
1 , 500 , 000 gallons 
900 , 000 gallons 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
fallout protection 
factor--48 
no 
Huron 
2 , i55 , 704 
Surfacewater--James 
River 
no 
3 , 000 , 000 gallons 
1 , 500 , 000 gallons 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
fallout protection 
factor--138 
no 
� .... 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis of the information obtained during this investigation 
led to the following conclusions: 
1. Both water treatment utilities that were investigated had 
fallout protection available within the existing plant for 
their personnel to operat� the plant under fallout conditions. 
Protection at the Huron plant exceeded the minimum standard 
recommended by the AWWA committee; the protection afforded 
by the water treatment structure at Brookings fell short of 
the value. 
2. Both water utility systems exceeded the recommendation of the 
AWWA committee on the amount of chemicals available for use in 
the event of a nuclear disaster. 
3. In the event of a nuclear disaster, the treatment plant at 
Brookings may be by-passed because a potable, non-radioactive 
source of water is available; i.e., the community could be 
supplied with potable water without the need for the operators 
to subject themselves to possible dangerous levels of radi-
ation intensities. 
4. Because of the quality of the James River, whi ch is the source 
of supply at Huron, the treatment plant should not be by-
passed. 
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5. A system of back-up power is available at Brookings to run 
both the treatment plant and the pumps of the distribution 
system should the main source of electrical power fail; how­
ever, the water treatment system at Huron would be severely 
affected if its main source of electrical power was lost. 
6. The Huron water facility should consider the installation of 
a back-up system of power to operate the treatment plant in 
the event of a power failure either from a nuclear disaster 
or otherwise. 
7 .  Based on the results of the evaluation of the Brookings and 
Huron water systems, it would appear that most water systems 
in South Dakota probably are ill informed of, and vulnerable 
in some respect to, the effects of a nuclear attack. 
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Figure 3 .  Input data for the calculation of fallout protection factors in Part 1 of the 
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Figure 4. Input data for the calculation of fallout protection factors in Part 2 of the 
Huron water treatment plant. 
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Figure 3. Results of the fallout analysis del ineating the protect ion factors at various 
locations in the Huron water treatment plant . 
01 
I-' 
(D I u Code J OOdo• Ne. 
I I I II II I 1 l�Sfft.sr'��i','�rl: : , 'l!� 1 L1 Lt tf:'1:'\, lbl �1h1 1A1 � , P  
A t 0 [ N T , , I C A T l0N 
] � •'91 _.  • "' d  .ct0•1"u of blC: 1 . I A M��v ,o,� tn I , •  JP .,r,1f'•" · t" t  f A � (  PRtN T ' 
@I SHELTER ANALYSIS FOR NEW DESIGNS � 'N:.t\• T:,\; ._.LL·TJ R 1E.i N.-'1 f?J L .1. l\i. fu'1: 61��,�'I,.Jlu Sh l eldi119 A11e l y 1 i 1  Fe,,.. I�;�':'�:1{::�� �- Sta••••• locat ,on No. 
-
7 .
_
;:l
•" I . l •••_'l';j"•_•_ C E N S U S  D . CONT AMINA T [ O  
V.,><,,,, •' , I I . N
o. •••U No. US[ ,I. AN E S 
-�..,.�-:-'\.;❖"�· '-< 0 I O l 3 ,o, ......... " • ... , •• ,, 
Side 8 Si,lo C Si,lo 0 
. .  -x. ,\ • -�h I I I I I I · · • • � 'l _ 
,, � . s
' 
Cod.. 7 . • • •  , bu••· 
I
" · l:la old••l 000.••·
,1
" · s]. 20. N o
f
l l .  s, .o, - -
- ·•
·
• �
.,
.'/ •·} 12 I I ). I 1' -�t,•4,. ' '0" 1h 0 1 01 lvb f't . ()l It, • \•c t., d• t••u (• J ·• ""  0 I 9 4 - · 0 7 2 • - O,l...,�-.. 5 -+t• : 0 I 3 j 0 Q) I :-:•::< 5 81 4 3 3 � I , C\ ,  5 ,  P. 0, ("), ("'), ("'), � �. 0 0, \ : Jf�\��.'.,� _& �><''-- . ♦ 'X�- "S..� rOX.• ,. .X.'\, :-.:-..::--: ._.v ---··.:.·.{-:"..'.·:{:::-:.; 
� , -0-�" 
• lo u lo .. ,.- r - •1 ( \llt  P•!t b,-, • . � , . ,. . 
. 
. t 'V\.� '"�  �� - �- l ,_.::,.,.� ·-'-� i';:;7✓:,:;;t"; "="•: 
II 01 .. [ M � I O M A L  D A T A  
: P IJ�t ; . . ... . , . .  � + 0 I O O -+ 0 0 0 - 0 0 2 - 0 0 I 3 
Hfl'• &hl ( ltfl't)  l •" &l h  C t f' f' \J 10. �10,, J I � r- ---�-- - -� ...,,.__ - -� - -
· 
- � r--· -- _.J,_ -
1 . T o
::r
• · ,·w:-r e--;;-.J •. ·, .. · ·1s. u-;;;., 11• · u••;;- i:7 · �-;;- .. s,de A·
r
-:- s:� �:·.�.��·:. 
J I ,4. W ,d•h · · ·  I 2 0 3 0 q ___ ,-3.. __ o _ _o 3 Q__i_Q_ 
•• •
'
• •"
& �:��: r .... , .... , ....... ;:t�·::n,e) ch��.. �: - 01 . Pt . j P l a" t  , •. M•••"' {• - 0 0 .3 q_ o_ -T 0 
1 ,-.,, I I 4 0 5 4 0 9 
0 ' � 2 :, . .. ,dth . ' . . 0 5 0 0 I O 0 
IV , 2 r , 0· , 0  1 ,2 , , , 0  o, _ ,  n , 1 - - ----- - - -- - 1 - .  
C S " AL L  ST A UC T U � O  D A T A  O N L Y  P lant 1•· >< • • l
ht • · -...:t.._9 _ __9-_ _  0 0 0_ 1,_ _0 . �--,:-7r:,: .. :,M�_:�{-�Y-N����r-_ .. � ,s.v �, �''-"v "• ) :i.. "•dlh • • 3 0 0 0 0 I O I 
�-:-:0�«-'.•.,:-:,;-:-:-:-:-: - :-:•r•'."�:'-A ,,}',..�- � " ()<�X �'%� ft • • •  -� ">':- �.-..v 
[;_.::-:•«:•:•► •=-:-: -:.:;-�:-:-:-:,-��·\·r ···t ··.:,·.v .. � .. .,,..... X" '· _,_..;;. . . □O•• ... ... ·"'' r-Ono uc ••· _,, ,-o ... ... ... Oft,, [J[o- ... .... ....  . . · •  · y · · · . . . .  , . .,, . ,  • ' 'JI · •�i<:-;[)6.),,'t:> -..· .•�JJ<,:�, n D r:-i .;;::�:::::::::>:<'.::;�:::��:::t:Y.-<•: •· -�. · •�-x r"-'>-x' .. _,.__.., . ,.,._ •· s .. ,., d•a•m \.'.., 0 0 4 0 w!dl � 0 I ! b 
• • • • 
• I 
• �t❖>: ;,,;_yy >-- w:--: • -- -� «-:, • ...,.. ..--.,•,•••• •,•,•,..,..•••••• eu,Lo,NG sr-ncH 
$ i'dc. c : : : 
.;.- , -����. • - ,�w.a ,� ... • • •-•-�..; •>:• ·{-: • - •;,,,.•. • • ···•:• ·-·�=-:.:.:.::.:: 
1 1 
1 
P lant 1 • ·  "• 1 1•1 • • • -+ 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 -+ 0 2. T 6 
I I I I I ----- - - - - -1- - - - � -'- - - - - -' - - - - - -'- - - - - -'- - - - -
:
4· ••d•h . .  (i. 0 � 0 , 1 0_ ,_ .. -- Q.�-� 
1 I I I P l ant •· "'''h' 1 + 0 I 2 � 0 I 2 - 0 0 4 
1 1 1 1 2 ; ,. Wodth · · · 0 I 3 0 4 0 3 0 0 
- """-- K- -,- - - -
$ioe. B 
I I I I I • 
• --
1 I I 1 Plane 1 t• ><••a•• · 
· · + 0 0 0 + (?_ 5) 0 0_ 
I I I I 
3 ' r.. w .,, • . . .
. · 
_...3_ �0 _Q __ 3 _ _Q__Q _Q__ 
:- - - - -�: - - - - - -:- - - - - -:- - - - -
•. .... : •• , •••• Ci.: DT�m;• Oft: □I r; .. ·;·· -� ot· ....... ... ,. OT� ... ;. ·� 
I I I l c. · d  O � - - -
1 ' M l ' i .; ' e ·" • • ►::�, ".. • " • - • • _•.xx ·=- •»: • ..  .::.:�-��: 
1 1 \,n uo 1\ I P lane , ,. " •• ah • . . + 0 0 0 -+ O O O -+ O • 2 I <a 
I C!. I I I I _ ..... _,___ ___ - - -1 
1 ,J\.\,el;d i no 1 
, 4· •·••" .  • • 3 o Q • .  · 3 o Q o 7 ;  6 - - - - - -·- - - - 1- - :- - - - - 1 - - - - - -1 - - - - - -, - - - - - Pla�, ; .. ... , ,  ... (10 0 0 - o_l ol i 
I I I I 2 , ,. "•••" . . . . .  ,_. : Q . . 0 3 io(O 
I I I 
- .. ,-. . . · 
lFl 1 1 P l;n e  : ,. M•• &
hl . • . O 
- q_ 
· o 
I I 
I I,, Wodlh • • • 0 Q I I 0 
----------�1 _____ ':""
1 
___ I 
-
- �- . � 
- - - - - - 1 t I I - - ,- - - - -
1 I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I - - - - - _ ,_ - - - - -'- �.ide, _1 A - - - -'- - _ ._ - -'- - - - -
- I I I I I 
I I I I I 
t '1 I I I 
1 I I I I 
I t I I I 
O C D  f' O tll M  l ? t A  I A � " t l.  t tl l l  
f .  A H II T U II U  
N o  
� , I t  t: ':�o:
c, 
� of S1 t 1  ,: •:::d Sv"" of S,
1 1  , :  •:.:d S
v- of S,, II 
,: 
'::� 
J 
t-----
--
----,-..+--J -�--,,--+
"
-
'
-1
' -
�
•
-
·
-
•
r
&hf Ao. ••d
tfli "•' · h. , , ... , 
Ap . -·-·"' "•' "'• •&"'' Ao
.
· · ••" .. ,, "'• • r 
.. 
, 
, ....... 
• 
• • • • - - - .. .. •• '[ .. ·- • �-- ♦- - - - ♦_J 
d.-t .. 
,0,,....,., • .,.. ,,, ,,. , ,,.tt'4 
s-.,-.. of 
Ap. • •dt" 
o o r -1. -l 9 o. __ .... __ ....: : Q 
4. UPP•·• ""'"' · · · 2 0 • 5 0 2 4 4 0 _ 7 0 
, �r::: .. �::;�� .@1 vi I I I I I I I I I I l I -, f I I I r T-, 
6. Sttit' p  """"'b•f 
�·�:-...:. . =- . V I : 
Figure 6. Input data for the calculation of fal lout protection factors of the Brookings 
water treatment plant. 
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Figure 6. (continued) 
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Figure 7 . Results of the fallout analys is delineating the protect ion factors at various 
locat ions in the Brookings water treatment plant . 
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